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Digital technologies permit the wide distribution of perfect
copies at virtually no marginal cost. Evidently this poses a problem for
content providers: how could they make money if their product is
freely available after its first sale?
As we all know, reframing the copyright laws has become the
answer. Notably, these revisions were an integrated international
policy campaign, not distinct national fights. The newly extended
control, based on legally reinforced digital "containers" and trade law,
arguably permits those who sell content effectively to "enclose" the
public domain, to insulate their business models, and to define
technological development.
In this article, I will argue that content providers are "recreating
the bottle" around their intellectual property, using digital technologies
to reinforce their business models and supplant copyright. The content
industries have successfully driven political fights, dramatically
strengthening their control of content in the digital era. International
treaties and agreements have been leveraged to strengthen and enforce
intellectual property protection, forcing a globally "harmonized"
reformulation of national laws. The resulting copyright policies have
not been a simple translation of the old laws and enforcement
mechanisms to a new technological era. In the revision of the
intellectual property laws, the content industries claimed new power to
control their intellectual property.
Secondly, I will show that the new policies adopted have
undermined the traditional balance in intellectual property law
between creator compensation and limits on the creator's exclusive
rights. IP law was created to foster a vibrant public domain by
encouraging the creation and exchange of knowledge. Recent
developments have shifted that balance with a dramatic and one-sided
strengthening of intellectual property rights. These policies
empowered digital containers, or code, and trade law as the new
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enforcers of intellectual property rights, but did not pay
complementary attention to user rights and the public domain.
Finally, I will argue that the particular resolution of the
copyright debate arguably has powerful implications beyond the
content industries or the balance of intellectual property. It could
influence the trajectory of technological innovation, indeed shaping
the network's architecture itself and the business models that harness
its capacities. Consider as only one example that many contend that
network expansion is driven not by content distribution, but by the
expansion of point-to-point communications. Yet, the intellectual
property rules concocted for content will powerfully shape the
architecture of the network. Will the network itself, as a result, evolve
differently and even more slowly than would otherwise be the case?
Furthermore, it appears that the major firms in the content
industries have the power to insulate themselves against competitive
pressures that would force change in their strategies and business
models. Rather than being forced to adapt and innovate, they have
entrenched their position and set the stage for its reinforcement, the
continuous expansion of intellectual property rights. At the moment it
appears that the walls around the content industry incumbents1 are
very powerful -- are there holes through which newcomers can enter?
Would such entrants break the mold; for example, could peer-to-peer
unravel the existing deals? Will affirmative policy action be required
to assure ongoing innovation in business models and technology?
II. THE ARGUMENTS ELABORATED
Copyright enforcement, and the balance between content
providers and the public, was predicated on a tangible balance of
powers between creators and consumers, a metaphoric bottle, where a
substance is at once contained and yet available to be circulated. But
some fear that the bottle is vanishing, that the emergence of networked
digital technologies has challenged, and then changed, copyright's
original deal. Copyright is a delicate balance, addressing information's
duality as both input and output of knowledge creation: copyright
reserves rights for creators to incentivize production, and limits those
rights to facilitate the exchange of ideas.
1 The most powerful of these incumbents are conglomerate producers
and distributors of content, such as AOL TimeWamer in print media and the
Motion Picture Association of America, who represents the major Hollywood
studios, and the Recording Industry Association of America.
2002-2003
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Copyright was enforced and its delicate balance was upheld
largely by default. Large-scale copyright infringement was mainly
precluded by the difficulty of replication and distribution, which left
the market for authentic (creator-licensed) versions intact. Limitations
on the exclusive rights of copyright were also realized by default: once
sold, producers could no longer control the private usage of their
works.
With little significant change, copyright has proven remarkably
adaptable to technological change, and content producers have been
forced to adjust to evolving technologies.2 They could invent new
business models to harness the capacities of the innovations, but could
not use the law to insulate themselves against innovation.3
Digital technologies have two components that undermine the
enforcement mechanisms inherent in tangible media. First,
information goods can now be perfectly replicated by users, or with
such a marginal loss of quality as to render a near-perfect copy. In
itself perfect replicability would generate a real challenge to those who
hold rights to content. Amplifying this effect, however, is the capacity
to distribute those ones and zeros across the network. The "bottle," in
its traditional sense, is vanishing.
The formerly noncommercial act of infringement may pose a
disproportionately large threat in the modern era: in the digital era,
you don't have to own a factory to reproduce and distribute pirated
music.. .you just need a computer and a phone cord.4 Unlike previous
challengers, such as the VCR and photocopier, networked digital
technologies and peer-to-peer capacities exponentially increase the
impact of a single violation.
Simultaneously, these technologies open new capacities for
architectural control of the information flows they facilitate,
empowering a new regulator: code.5 Code is the stuff of which digital
2 Sony v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984); Galoob v.
Nintendo, 507 U.S. 985 (1993). See also JAY DRATLER, JR., CYBERLAW:
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE DIGITAL MILLENIUM (2000).
3 Lawrence Lessig, "Expert Report of Professor Lessig Pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2)(b)",
3-4, at http: //www.stanford.edu/lessig/content/testimony/nap
napd3.pdf
4 Pamela Samuelson and Randall Davis, "The Digital Dilemma:
Intellectual Property in the Information Age", at
http: //www. sims.berkeley.edu/-pam/papers/digdilsyn.pdf.
5 Lessig, supra note 3, at 13. See also Mark Stefik, "Round One:
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infrastructure and software applications are made. Digital products
are constructed entirely of digitized elements from this programming;
their encoded architectures have the power to set and enforce a
particular set of terms and conditions. This regulatory mechanism
differs sharply from conventional law in that it is perfectly self-
enforcing.6 Thus, not only do encoded technical architectures set the
norms and rules of access and usage, they enforce them independently.
A. PROPOSITION ONE: RECREATING THE BOTTLE
Content owners responded quickly to what they called the
"digital threat," arguing that these new capacities for individuals to
privately reproduce and distribute copyrighted material would destroy
the market for sales of their intellectual property. Furthermore,
intellectual property owners/distributors are concerned that national
variation in intellectual property rights (IPRs) and enforcement
undermines the value of their property. Weaker standards for legal
protection and enforcement permit unauthorized use and copying, or
"piracy," which, they argue, translates into lost revenues. The content
industries' concerns have taken on a new urgency with increased
economic globalization.
Responding to this two-part threat, content owners have pushed
new standards for IP protection. In both domestic and international
fora, their successful lobby has produced a strikingly different
approach to copyright, regulating technologies themselves and
allowing copyright holders to insulate themselves against change.
Two major developments mark the content industry's victory
and permitted them to remake the "bottle." The first set of policies
reinforces the new digital capacities to control content, empowering
privately constructed code. The same technologies that seemed to pose
a digital threat were transformed into mechanisms of IP control.
Content owners can now use code to control their intellectual property:
new anti-circumvention provisions prohibit technologies that could be
used to circumvent measures used to protect copyrighted material.
Unlike traditional containers, such as books and analog tapes, digital
media are constructed from a highly structured architecture.
Copyright owners may no longer need the formal law of copyright: the
unbound/forum/copyright/stefikl.htm. See also Pamela Samuelson, "Technological
Protection for Copyrighted Works", draft as of 2/14/96, at
http://www.sims.berkeley.edu/-pam/
courses/cyberlaw97/docs/techpro.pdf.
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code will enforce itself, according to rules and standards set by the
owners themselves.
Second, the newly created WTO-TRIPS sets and enforces
global standards for IP. The WTO-TRIPS Agreement legitimizes and
institutionalizes the content industry's longstanding effort to
strengthen and enforce IP protection globally, reframing IP as a trade
issue. Some would argue that the WTO will take on its own
independent institutional capacity to govern IP issues. At a minimum,
as a treaty and a court, it will frame the debate and structure the fights.
1. REGULATING THROUGH CODE
After the content industry's first efforts to technologically
protect their works failed,7 a broad industry coalition (hereinafter
"Content") pressured the Clinton Administration and Congress for
legislation that would make digital media safe for online distribution of
their works. Characterizing new "user capacities" as a deadly threat,
content producers successfully captured the Administration's
attention.
Content's agenda quickly became the driver of U.S. intellectual
property policy-making effort. Content targeted the Clinton
Administration's working group on intellectual property whose 1995
"White Paper" articulates the U.S. digital agenda that has driven
policy-making efforts, both domestically and internationally, to date.'
That agenda formed the basis of the outcomes in three critical arenas:
the World Intellectual Property Organization integrated the agenda in
its 1996 Copyright Treaty; the U.S. codified the agenda in its 1998
Digital Millennium Copyright Act; and the European Union followed
in 2001 with its Copyright Directive. The EU had been anxious to be
the first to codify the implementation, and to set the legislative
precedent for copyright's adaptation. Despite the European
Commission's rushed efforts to draft a Copyright Treaty, the U.S.
again set the precedent, in its 1998 Digital Millennium Copyright Act.
7 Mark Solomons, Hackers Crack Digital Music Codes, FIN. TIMES, Oct.
14, 2000.
8 Bruce A. Lehman, "Intellectual Property and the National
Information Infrastructure", Sept. 1995, at
ttp.i/wvr.eff.o 'I_/pgn See also Pamela Samuelson,
US Digital Agenda at WIPO, 37 VA. J. INT'L. L. 369.
B. KEMP
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The ostensible goal of the agenda was to make the digital
environment safe for the sale of copyrighted works. 9 These policies
went beyond a mere extension of traditional copyright to digital
media. 1 Calling on the potential for new technical capacities to
encode architectural protections, Content convinced policymakers that
legal reinforcement for such technical protection systems was
necessary to bridge the transition to the network era.
Voicing Content's concerns, these policies argue that the nature
of network technologies demands technical incapacitation of possible
violators, rather than reliance on the threat of liability as a deterrent.
The anti-circumvention measures are intended to reinforce technical
protection for copyrighted works, by making it illegal to circumvent
such efforts.11  The anti-circumvention provisions prohibit the
manufacture or distribution of any device, technology, or service
whose primary purpose or effect is to circumvent (without the
authority of the copyright owner or the law) any mechanism that
protects an exclusive right of copyright. 12
In its broad reinforcement of technical protection schemes, this
policy approach gives copyright owners the right to define and enforce
privately architected terms of access and usage, whose variable
conditions may extend far beyond the exclusive rights of copyright.
This approach gives copyright holders control over any digital
transmission of their works, restricting intellectual property to an
unprecedented degree.13
The process by which these policies were crafted is worth
noting. Content providers arguably leveraged an international
institution to re-open its domestic battle. The Clinton Administration
had planned to first seek domestic legislation of the agenda, and then
press the agenda abroad, at the upcoming World Intellectual Property
Organization meeting.14 Though the first effort to adopt these
recommendations failed in both houses,15 the Administration did not
9 Lehman, supra note 8.
10 Samuelson, US Digital Agenda at WIPO, supra note 5. See also
Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the Digital Economy: Why the Anti-
Circumvention Regulations Need to Be Revised, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 519 (1999).
11 Lehman, supra note 8.
12 National Infrastructure Information Copyright Protection Act of
1995.
13 Samuelson, Intellectual Property, supra note 10.
14 The World Intellectual Property Organization is the administering body
of the Berne Convention, an international treaty established to set minimum
standards for intellectual property laws in all member nations.
15 See the Digital Future Coalition webpage, atj //iwwwdfc.or/dfcl /Active Issues/graohic/DMCA index.html, detailing the
history of the DMCA.
2002-2003
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reformulate the agenda. Instead, the Administration reversed its
course, successfully pressing its agenda at the WIPO meeting. The
agenda that so heavily favored the content coalition found new life at
the World Intellectual Property Organization's meetings, and became
the basis for the WIPO Copyright Treaty (1996). The Administration
was then able to return to the US for domestic implementation of the
treaty, rather than policymaking-from-scratch, and at this stage, a
version of the Content-proposed solution was probably unavoidable.
It is worth noting that an international organization was not
merely the vehicle for reconciling competing international positions,
but rather became another channel for a domestic fight. The WIPO
Copyright Treaty functioned as both a vehicle for extending a national
agenda abroad, and the tool of a particular set of domestic interests to
force a second round in a domestic fight.
Trade policy is another important instrument in the copyright
wars: Though content providers have consistently pushed to raise
standards for intellectual property protection, their efforts have found
new success recently. As IP has taken on increasing economic
significance, national differences in IP protection have become a
source of tension in international economic relations. The WTO-
TRIPS16 was created to address and remedy these differences. TRIPS
establishes international rules to set and enforce minimum standards
for IP protection, and acceptance of the Agreement in full is
compulsory upon joining the WTO.
TRIPS was not the first international attempt to harmonize
standards for IP protection. The Berne and Paris Conventions,
administered by the World Intellectual Property Organization
(WIPO), set forth minimum standards for IP protection. These
Conventions and their Appendices are upheld by member states'
voluntary acceptance -- member states can choose the treaties with
which they wish to comply -- and cooperative reciprocity.
Building on the standards articulated in these Conventions,
TRIPS has been dubbed by some the "Berne and Paris-plus
Agreement." The WTO-TRIPS Agreement incorporates these
Conventions,17 and adds two significant elements to the package.
16 World Trade Organization's Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property Rights, created out of the Uruguay Round ending 1994.
Intellectual property is now considered one of the three pillars of the trade
organization, joining goods and services. For more information, see
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/trips-e/trips-e.htm
17 Notably, TRIPS incorporates all aspects of the Paris and Berne
Conventions except the sections relating to "moral rights" of authorship, a strong
B. KEMP
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First, TRIPS establishes new and strengthened IPRs, where those of
the Paris and Berne Conventions were considered "inadequate."
Second, and most importantly, administration under the WTO
includes new mechanisms for formal oversight and dispute
settlement.Is
With the creation of the WTO-TRIPS Agreement, we have
shifted from WIPO's cooperative treaty system to a rule-based trade
system, newly enforceable under the "Trade Supercourt."
International rule of law for intellectual property now has bite.
B. PROPOSITION Two: UNDOING THE BALANCE
The tactics employed by content owners not only recreated the
IP bottle but also dramatically shifted the balance of control between
creators protections and consumers rights.
First, it is the privately-architected nature of code that gives it
such power: at present, there are no rules as to what code must allow,
no body of rights and regulations to govern these digital walls,
passages, and checkpoints. Content owners can set their own terms of
access and use, terms that may effectively enclose the public domain
within private holdings of the copyright owner. As such, copyright's
crucial limitations and exceptions are facing a stealth attack,
embedded in the structure of the media themselves.
Second, TRIPS' trade-based approach to intellectual property
undermines the complex balance of values IP was created to protect
and uphold, and marks a conscious and deliberate effort to reframe
these issues according to a narrow set of economic preferences.19
Compensation for creation, designed to be merely a means to achieve
an enriched public domain, has now become the focus and end goal of
intellectual property protection.
tradition in continental copyright law that has been rejected by "common law"
jurisdictions such as the US.
18 The Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
administers TRIPS, and monitors national implementation/compliance with the
Agreement. National governments are required to notify the Council of any change
in their IP law, and the Council serves as a forum for member review and
consultation on TRIPS. All dispute resolution is conducted under the WTO formal
mechanism.
19 Question for discussion: does a trade-based approach inherently
shift this balance? Or have the politics surrounding TRIPS' creation imposed this
particular set of values and preferences on international IP governance?
2002-2003
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To maintain a vibrant public domain, do we need to translate
copyright's limitations, such as the principle of fair use, from their
traditional form to create equivalents for a digital era? Does this
require affirmative policy action or, as some argue, will the market
achieve IP's underlying goals, diversity in information production and
an enriched public domain?
The first policies/treaties to reformulate copyright for the
digital era claimed to be mere translations and moderate adaptations of
copyright's traditional balance, an update for new technologies.
Changes in these two domains shift the balance between copyright
holders and the public domain. First, while these policies reinforce
Content's new capacities to digitally control their content, copyright's
crucial limitations are wilting without viable reinforcement. Second,
the shift to a trade-based regime may provide content owners with a
tool to consistently strengthen intellectual property rights.
C. HARNESSING CODE TO SUPPLANT
COPYRIGHT' S LIMITATIONS
Copyright was designed to promote the exchange of ideas.2 °
To incentivize creation, copyright grants authors specific rights in their
work, but these rights are bounded by key limitations that protect
public access to and use of the intellectual property. First, "fair use"
privileges exempt certain types of use from copyright infringement,
without the prior permission of the copyright holder. These privileges
serve to protect personal and educational uses whose social value
outweighs the author's interests. Second, after copyright's expiration,
public usage of the work is entirely unrestricted.21
Thus, intellectual property was never "propertized" in a
traditional sense. Rather, its balance was carefully crafted to create a
public domain, a virtual space in which ideas, knowledge, and
expression are free for public appropriation. The public domain
underpins the cumulative creation of knowledge, building upon the
body of knowledge and information that already exists.
Despite their crucial function, many of the former limits on
copyright have been functionally ignored in debates about how to
20 ROBERT P. MERGES AND PETER S. MENELL, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE, 12, 351-2 (2d ed. 2000).
21 See the Electronic Frontier Foundation website, at www.eff.org.
149B. KEMP
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reformulate intellectual property for a digital era.22 The recent anti-
circumvention policies reinforce the new capacities for increased
control over content, giving copyright owners the right to use code to
preclude access entirely, or prohibit particular uses of their works. This
reinforcement effectively strengthens copyright, but this strengthening
has not been matched by comparable reinforcement of copyright's
limitations.
23
Responding to concerns raised by Content's opposition, these
laws did officially address copyright's balance and limitations,
affirming the need to uphold a balance between content owners and
users and extending the traditional limitations into the digital era.24
The policies intentionally ignored the matter of real importance,
however: privately constructed code changes the game, creating
mechanisms for near-perfect, permanent control of information goods
and services.
Copyright's limitations, recall, hinge on access to the content in
question. Copyright's limitations were not affirmative rights, however,
because they didn't need to be. In tangible media, the user had the right
and means by which to claim their privileged use. If you could "get
your hands on it," you could make use of copyrighted materials. In
some cases, this usage would be infringement, in others fair use, but
the first decision was the users'. The wrong choice was only liable for
copyright infringement after the fact. Thus, copyright's limitations
functioned primarily as a guideline and a defense.25
Many argue that copyright's digital update has undermined this
balance. Content owners can use digital technologies to build
elaborate fences around content, defining and technically enforcing the
terms of use and access. Unlike the traditional methods of copyright
enforcement, encoded architectures do not have to comply with any
law or standard, superceding copyright's limitations.
Because the architect sets the rules, these systems can be used to
control content in radically new ways, including, for example, the
22 Pamela Samuelson, "Legally Speaking: the NII Intellectual
Property Report", available at
http://www.eff.org/IP//ipwg-niiip-report-samuelson.comments.
23 Dan L. Burk and Julie E. Cohen, Fair Use Infrastructure for Rights
Management Systems, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 41 (2001).
24 The anti-circumvention provision of the DMCA, for example,
stipulated "nothing in this section shall affect rights, remedies, limitations or defenses
applicable to copyright infringement, including fair use."
25 MERGES AND MENELL, supra note 20.
2002-2003
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enclosure of intellectual property in private holdings.26 How so? First,
encoded architectures do not expire. Digital works elude any
'publication date' from which expiration could be calculated. Second,
fair use can be entirely precluded. A mere statement of rights as legal
defense is powerless: if one can't access code-protected works, one can't
claim a legitimate use.27 Fair use, the long-time counterbalance to the
exclusive rights, is now subject to the discriminate authorization of
private actors.
The evident question is whether the concerns of the Content
coalition could have been met without undermining either side of the
present balance between protection of copyright holders and users.
Did we have to make a stark practical choice between protection and
fair use? An alternate strategy would require more than a re-assertion
of the rights of fair use and the importance of the public domain. The
balance had to be reconstructed.
In addition to reinforcing Content's new capacities to protect
their exclusive rights, policymakers needed to innovate and include an
equally innovative mechanism by which to protect fair use, which now
meant a means to generate and maintain the possibility of fair use.
Nothing, however, was included to provide for the realization of the
traditional exceptions, nor have the policies compensated for these
losses.28 The end result: public access is now the incidental by-product
of the market for intellectual property sales, rather than its primary
justification.29
D. USING TRADE AS AN INSTRUMENT TO STRENGTHEN
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION
Empowered code is only the first part of the story of
strengthened IP protection and its shifting balance. The WTO-TRIPS
enforcement mechanism may be used as a tool for content producers
to systematically strengthen and enforce IPRs globally, and may erode
its underlying balance.
26 Samuelson, Technological Protection, supra note 5. See also Lawrence
Lessig, "Internet Regulation Through Architectural Modification," subsection D, at
http://v/wvw.hatvardlawreview.org/issues/112/7 1634.htm.
27 David Nimmer, A Riff on Fair Use in the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 673-742 (2000).
28 Post-adoption joint study, anti-circumvention hearings: comments
from the Electronic Frontier Foundation and the D.C. Library Association.
29 With the DMCA, Congress affirmed and legitimized content
owners' increased control and abandoned copyright's traditional technological
neutrality. In addition, the DMCA lends the weight of the state to closed encoded
architectures, which may have adverse effects on the architecture of the network.
B. KEMP
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A trade-based approach assumes and imposes a set of economic
assumptions on IP. The TRIPS Agreement reframes IP according to
this narrow economic framework, legitimizing content producers'
pressure on other nations to strengthen their IPRs. Indeed, TRIPS
provides content owners the mechanism by which to drive this
strengthening. As such, a trade-based regime may unravel the
complex balance of values IP was created to protect and uphold.
What is more, because the IP deals vary cross-nationally, this
externally-crafted compromise will have different consequences for
each of the WTO's member-states and their national polities.30
In TRIPS, content producers won endorsement for their
reformulation of GATT's commitment to reduce trade barriers. In
theory, the reduction of trade barriers should increase global trade,
benefit all participants, and facilitate the diffusion of wealth across
borders.31 Traditionally, this meant encouraging the equal treatment
of goods, whether foreign or domestic in origin, and reducing tariffs.
In the Uruguay Round, IP owners argued that national differences in
the level of protection for IP are a barrier to trade; content producers
would be more willing to produce and distribute their products abroad
if rules were uniform. Embedded in their argument, however, is the
assumption that insufficient, rather than merely variable, IPRs were the
barrier. Though this argument is controversial, TRIPS incorporates
the notion that strengthened IPRs will encourage trade and economic
development.
The content industries can now use the WTO to ratchet up
IPRs by playing one jurisdiction off the other: TRIPS institutionalizes
and legitimates the use of trade sanctions to strengthen and enforce IP
protection. This trick is not a new one: IP owners have regularly
pressured trade representatives to impose unilateral trade sanctions
against countries with weaker IP protection. Their battles were multi-
front, however, and their outcomes less significant: IP owners pressed
for bilateral agreements, but their victories were narrow.
TRIPS consolidates these battles, channeling them into two
institutions. First, TRIPS assigned WIPO and its Conventions a new
legislative significance: its treaties fall within the TRIPS standards.3 2
30 Many argue that TRIPS will systematically transfer resources from
developing (IP consumer) to industrialized (IP producer) countries.
31 The advantages of trade-based agreements, access to other
countries' markets and equal treatment within those markets, supposedly outweigh
the costs, costs that include ceding some control over the rules and dynamics of
national economies.
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Second, member-states can now use the WTO's dispute resolution
mechanism to 'regulate' compliance with these standards.33
Content's battles are now fought, and have been won, in the
policymaking processes at the WTO and WIPO.
3 4
While TRIPS resolves some trade tensions, it introduces new
frictions, as it imposes a narrowly-construed version of economic
efficiency on a matter of cultural and social welfare. Like the other
policies to update copyright to the digital era, TRIPS acknowledges the
need to strike a balance between IP producers and users. What TRIPS
does not acknowledge is that it shifts that balance in favor of IP
owners. The economic preferences according to which these issues
will be settled reframe the matter entirely. A trade regime tends to
systematically neglect those issues it deems economically
inconsequential or unquantifiable. As a result, a trade-based approach
may undermine the purposes for which IP protection was crafted,
diversity in information production and an enriched public domain.
Compensation was formerly a tool, and now seems to be the
end itself.
33 TRIPS is not a powerful institution in its own right: its treaties must
be adopted by consensus, its dispute resolution is member-instigated.33 Thus, with
TRIPS, the WTO becomes the mechanism by which countries adjudicate their
differences over IP. Many argue that the WTO dispute resolution mechanism will
become a tool by which the industrialized countries export stronger standards for IP
protection. For example, the US can threaten India with cross-product sanctions on
textiles as punishment for lackadaisical IP enforcement. India holds no such 'trump'
card. Interview with Peter Holmes (August 10, 2001).
34 Whether the US continues to use its 'special 301' process to achieve
higher standards of protection/ more favorable terms in negotiations with less-
powerful states is an interesting question. Though arguably its sanctions are no
longer necessary, because IP can now be enforced through a legitimate WTO
decision, the US refused to remove the 301 sanctions from its laws (promising to use
them only as authorized by the WTO).
B. KEMP
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